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1  |  INTRODUC TION
Seeking to reverse the loss of forests and forest carbon stocks in 
developing countries, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC)1 created the mechanism known as 
REDD+.2 This was introduced in a simple format at the UNFCCC 
Conference of the Parties (COP) in 20053 and has since evolved into 
its current version: reducing emissions from deforestation and for-
est degradation, plus fostering conservation, sustainable manage-
ment of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.4 REDD+ 
operates on the basis of performance- based payments— that is, pay-
ments are conditional on the outcome of a REDD+ action.5
Brazil can benefit from REDD+, given that it holds around 60% of 
the Amazon’s 5.4 million km2 of tropical forest and is under ongoing 
land- use pressure.6 Amazonian indigenous territories store 27.1% of 
the region’s aboveground carbon (28,247 MtC; i.e. 28.247 million 
tonnes of carbon7) on roughly 30% of the land area.8 The indigenous 
 1United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, 
entered into force 21 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107.
 2A Angelsen et al (eds), Realising REDD+: National Strategy and Policy Options (Center for 
International Forestry Research (CIFOR) 2009).
 3Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in 
Developing Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action’ UN Doc FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1 
(2005).
 4UNFCCC, ‘Warsaw Framework for REDD- Plus’ (UNFCCC 2018) <https://unfccc.int/
topic s/land- use/resou rces/warsa w- frame work- for- redd- plus>.
 5Angelsen et al (n 2) 18.
 6MCC Stabile et al, ‘Solving Brazil’s Land Use Puzzle: Increasing Production and Slowing 
Amazon Deforestation’ (2020) 91 Land Use Policy 104362.
 7W Walker et al, ‘Forest Carbon in Amazonia: The Unrecognized Contribution of 
Indigenous Territories and Protected Natural Areas’ (2014) 5 Carbon Management 479, 
480.
 8AC Crisostomo et al, ‘Terras indígenas na Amazônia brasileira: reservas de carbono e 
barreiras ao desmatamento’ (IPAM 2015).
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Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) was intro-
duced by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as 
a mechanism to reverse the loss of forests and carbon stocks in developing countries. 
REDD+ operates on the basis of performance- based payments. This article focuses 
on REDD+ as a market- based mechanism in the voluntary carbon market (VCM). It 
assesses the viability of using REDD+ on indigenous lands in the Brazilian Amazon 
by examining three key aspects of REDD+— the legal, technical and market require-
ments— in light of recent policy developments in Brazil and under the UNFCCC. 
REDD+ as a market- based mechanism in the VCM currently faces significant barriers 
as a useful tool for forest protection in the Amazon, due to the lack of an international 
carbon market under the UNFCCC, the highly complex technical requirements, and 
the low market demand for REDD+ credits in the VCM. Moreover, we suggest that, 
although legally possible under Brazilian law, REDD+ projects in the VCM may not be 
a suitable market- based option for indigenous communities in the Amazon due to the 
current national and international climate policy context.
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communities of the Brazilian Amazon9 have legal title over around 1 
million km2 of these forests.10 In practice, Brazil already benefits from 
REDD+ funding resulting from the Green Climate Fund and the 
Amazon Fund.11 The crucial role of indigenous communities in ensur-
ing forest conservation and the sustainable use of natural resources 
is well recognized in academic literature.12 The potential benefits of 
REDD+ projects in promoting indigenous rights and improving liveli-
hoods have been discussed,13 as have the challenges in implementing 
REDD+14— including the importance of governance arrangements15 
and technical issues concerning measuring and monitoring forest car-
bon stocks.16 It is recognized that developing countries— particularly 
Brazil— still face many hurdles in achieving a coherent REDD+ policy 
that addresses the needs of diverse local and indigenous communi-
ties.17 As the rights of indigenous peoples are often challenged, the 
general view is that a robust legal framework that recognizes their 
rights, ensures community participation, and provides for good 
governance— including free prior and informed consent18 and benefit- 
sharing— is a prerequisite for effective REDD+ projects.19
Indigenous peoples’ rights are in the spotlight given the current 
political context in Brazil. The federal government, in power since 
January 2019, is notable for its discourse against environmental pro-
tection and indigenous peoples’ rights.20 After backtracking on a 
proposed merger of the agriculture and environment ministries, the 
government introduced significant budget cuts to key environmental 
agencies such as FUNAI (National Indigenous Peoples Foundation), 
which is responsible for safeguarding indigenous peoples’ rights; the 
law- enforcement agency IBAMA (Brazilian Institute of the 
Environment and Renewable Natural Resources) and ICMBio (Chico 
Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation). The Secretariat of 
Climate Change and Forests was extinguished and approximately 
95% of the funding for climate action was cut,21 as was the federal 
budget for forest management and conservation, fire control and 
forest monitoring. There have also been changes in the leadership 
and personnel of such agencies.22 Furthermore, the federal govern-
ment proposed a series of bills and amendments, most not yet ap-
proved by the Parliament, to open indigenous lands to mining and 
other economic activities,23 as well as measures that allegedly favour 
agribusinesses and land grabbing.24 Against this background, the 
2019 fires and record high rates of deforestation announced by INPE 
(National Institute for Space Research) have heightened attention on 
the Amazon.25 In light of these developments— and 15 years after its 
inception— it is timely to consider whether REDD+ still has a role in 
reversing the loss of tropical forests, as well as the prospects for ben-
efits to be derived from future REDD+ activity.
This article aims to discuss whether REDD+ in the voluntary car-
bon market (VCM) is currently an adequate tool for forest protection 
in the Brazilian Amazon and specifically on indigenous lands, consid-
ering national law and the international climate change regime. To 
answer this question, we consider three key elements of REDD+: the 
legal, technical and market requirements involved in implementing 
REDD+ projects. Basically, there are two distinct approaches to 
REDD+ as it can take the form of (i) a market- based mechanism, ei-
ther within or outside the UNFCCC, which involves the trading of 
carbon offsets or (ii) a fund- based mechanism, whereby developing 
countries can request financial compensation, known as ‘results- 
based payments’,26 for reducing emissions from deforestation and 
 9Walker et al (n 7); EM Nogueira et al, ‘Brazil’s Amazonian Protected Areas as a Bulwark 
against Regional Climate Change’ (2018) 18 Regional Environmental Change 573; G 
Piffer Salles, DT Paiva Salinas and SR Paulino, ‘How Funding Source Influences the Form 
of REDD+ Initiatives: The Case of Market Versus Public Funds in Brazil’ (2017) 139 
Ecological Economics 91, 99.
 10D Nepstad et al, ‘Inhibition of Amazon Deforestation and Fire by Parks and Indigenous 
Lands’ (2006) 20 Conservation Biology 65.
 11See <https://www.green clima te.fund/count ries/brazil>.
 12Nepstad et al (n 10); Walker et al (n 7); C Corrigan et al, ‘Quantifying the Contribution 
to Biodiversity Conservation of Protected Areas Governed by Indigenous Peoples and 
Local Communities’ (2018) 227 Biological Conservation 403.
 13K Evans, L Murphy and W de Jong, ‘Global versus Local Narratives of REDD: A Case Study 
from Peru’s Amazon’ (2014) 35 Environmental Science and Policy 98; T Loaiza, U Nehren 
and G Gerold, ‘REDD+ Implementation in the Ecuadorian Amazon: Why Land Configuration 
and Common- Pool Resources Management Matter’ (2016) 70 Forest Policy and Economics 
67; M Aguilar- Støen, ‘Better Safe than Sorry? Indigenous Peoples, Carbon Cowboys and the 
Governance of REDD in the Amazon’ (2017) 44 Forum for Development Studies 44.
 14CI Salimon et al, ‘Estimating State- Wide Biomass Carbon Stocks for a REDD Plan in 
Acre, Brazil’ (2011) 262 Forest Ecology and Management 555; CSMN Vitel et al, 
‘Land- Use Change Modeling in a Brazilian Indigenous Reserve: Construction of a 
Reference Scenario for the Suruí REDD Project’ (2013) 41 Human Ecology 807; S Strey 
et al, ‘Digging Deeper: The Value of Deep Soil Carbon for Potential REDD+ Projects in 
Tropical Forest Communities in Amazonia’ (2017) 71 Erdkunde 231; Nogueira et al (n 9).
 15TN Maraseni et al, ‘An Assessment of the Impacts of the REDD+ Pilot Project on 
Community Forests User Groups (CFUGs) and Their Community Forests in Nepal’ (2014) 
136 Journal of Environmental Management 37.
 16Salimon et al (n 14); Vitel et al (n 14); Strey et al (n 14); Nogueira et al (n 9).
 17Piffer Salles et al (n 9) 99.
 18United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘Free Prior and Informed 
Consent – An Indigenous Peoples’ Right and a Good Practice for Local Communities 
– FAO’ (14 October 2016) <https://www.un.org/devel opmen t/desa/Indig enous peopl es/
publi catio ns/2016/10/free- prior - and- infor med- conse nt- an- Indig enous - peopl es- right 
- and- a- good- pract ice- for- local - commu nitie s- fao/>.
 19Loaiza et al (n 13); G Vergara- Asenjo et al, ‘A Participatory Approach to Elucidate the 
Consequences of Land Invasions on REDD+ Initiatives: A Case Study with Indigenous 
Communities in Panama’ (2017) 12 PLOS One. See also P Moutinho et al, ‘REDD no 
Brasil: um enfoque amazônico. Fundamentos, critérios e estruturas institucionais para 
um regime nacional de Redução de Emissões’ (Centro de Gestão e Estudos Estratégicos, 
Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental da Amazônia and Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos da 
Presidência da República 2012) 61; P Bottazzi et al, ‘Carbon Sequestration in Community 
Forests: Trade- Offs, Multiple Outcomes and Institutional Diversity in the Bolivian 
Amazon’ (2014) 45 Development and Change 105; A Blackman and P Veit, ‘Titled 
Amazon Indigenous Communities Cut Forest Carbon Emissions’ (2018) 153 Ecological 
Economics 56; TAP West, ‘Indigenous Community Benefits from a De- Centralized 
Approach to REDD+ in Brazil’ (2016) 16 Climate Policy 924.
 20D Abessa et al, ‘The Systematic Dismantling of Brazilian Environmental Laws Risks 
Losses on All Fronts’ (2019) 3 Nature Ecology & Evolution 510.
 21ibid 2; R Mariz, ‘Ministério do Meio Ambiente bloqueia 95% da verba para o clima’ (O 
Globo, 8 May 2019) <https://oglobo.globo.com/socie dade/minis terio - do- meio- ambie 
nte- bloqu eia- 95- da- verba - para- clima - 23646502>.
 22Established by Decree 10.234 of 11 February 2020.
 23Bill 191 of 2020. See also E Johnson Pereira et al, ‘Policy in Brazil (2016– 2019) 
Threaten Conservation of the Amazon Rainforest’ (2019) 100 Environmental Science and 
Policy 8.
 24Provisional Measure 910 of December 2019 and subsequent Bill 2622 of 2020. The bill 
also proposes changes in the Indigenous Peoples’ Statute, Law 6.001 of 19 December 
1973.
 25In 2019, deforestation in the Legal Amazon was 10,129 km2. See <http://www.inpe.br/
notic ias/notic ia.php?Cod_Notic ia=5465>.
 26L Wallbott and E Recio, ‘Practicing Human Rights across Scale: Indigenous Peoples’ 
Affectedness and Recognition in REDD+ Governance’ (2018) 3 Third World Thematics 
785.
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forest degradation. There is not yet an international carbon market 
established under the UNFCCC and the 2015 Paris Agreement. 
Currently, REDD+ is used as a carbon market mechanism only in the 
voluntary carbon market, where REDD+ carbon credits have been 
commercialized. The focus of this article is on this market modality of 
REDD+. We analyse all existing REDD+ projects in the Brazilian 
Amazon under Verra (formerly the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS)),27 
which is the only international carbon standard that has generated 
carbon credits in Brazil. Following a discussion of the different modal-
ities of REDD+ (Section 2), we provide an overview of Brazil’s emis-
sions reduction target under the 2015 Paris Agreement (Section 3) 
and the existing REDD+ projects in the Brazilian Amazon (Sections 4 
and 5). We then examine the key aspects of REDD+, which include 
legal (Section 6), technical (Section 7) and market (section 8) require-
ments. We conclude with an assessment of the current feasibility of 
REDD+ projects in the voluntary carbon market for forest protection 
in the Brazilian Amazon and future prospects given possible changes 
in market demand, including sectoral offset schemes (Section 9).
2  |  CL ARIF YING REDD+
Globally, market- based mechanisms have been used as a climate 
mitigation tool since the 1997 Kyoto Protocol,28 which formed the 
basis for the first international carbon market.29 A ‘carbon market’ 
refers to the buying and selling of carbon credits that have been ei-
ther distributed by a regulatory body or generated by carbon offset 
projects.30 The international carbon market can be separated into 
two submarkets: the compliance (or regulatory) market and the vol-
untary market.31 In the compliance market, carbon credits are traded 
to meet regulated emission reduction targets. Carbon markets are 
voluntary where emission reduction targets are not imposed by 
law.32 This market does not rely on legally mandated emission reduc-
tions to generate demand,33 and buyers voluntarily seek to offset 
emissions by purchasing carbon credits.34 In comparison, the Kyoto 
Protocol created a compulsory carbon market by which emission re-
duction units were traded to allow industrialized countries to meet 
their assigned emission reduction targets.35 In the voluntary market, 
there are no such legal obligations.
Currently, REDD+ takes the form of a market mechanism only 
in the VCM. Following the Kyoto Protocol, no other compulsory 
carbon market has been created under the UNFCCC. Verra is now 
the international carbon standard most used in the VCM.36 The 
Paris Agreement urges parties to conserve and enhance carbon 
sinks and use voluntary cooperation between countries to trans-
fer mitigation outcomes.37 This may set the basis for a future 
global market mechanism, but it remains a matter of speculation. 
Recent UNFCCC negotiations did not agree on modalities and 
procedures for market- based mechanisms under Article 6 of the 
Paris Agreement.38
As noted earlier, REDD+ can also take the form of a fund- based 
mechanism. This modality of REDD+ has raised essential resources 
for developing countries, notably in Latin America.39 There are vari-
ous initiatives that channelled unprecedented amounts of funding 
for the implementation of fund- based REDD+ in developing coun-
tries, such as the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) hosted 
by the World Bank, the UN- REDD Programme, and official develop-
ment aid.40 Such initiatives are likely to continue, both within and 
beyond the UNFCCC.41
3  |  BR A ZIL’S EMISSIONS TARGET UNDER 
THE PARIS AGREEMENT
Brazil’s greenhouse gas emissions target under the Paris Agreement 
is a reduction in annual emissions of 37% by 2025 (using a baseline 
of 2005).42 The country also proposed an intended reduction of 43% 
of baseline emissions by 2030.43
 27Verra was founded in 2005 by environmental and business leaders who saw the need 
for greater quality assurance in voluntary carbon markets. See <https://verra.org/about 
- verra/ who- we- are/>.
 28Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(adopted 11 December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) 2303 UNTS 148 arts 
6, 12, 17. See also B Garcia, ‘Carbon Trading as a Climate Change Mitigation Tool’ in S 
Alam, JH Bhuiyan and J Razzaque (eds), International Natural Resources Law, Investment 
and Sustainability (Routledge 2018); R Bayon, A Hawn and K Hamilton, Voluntary Carbon 
Markets: An International Business Guide to What They Are and How They Work (Routledge 
2012) 5.




 33Bayon, Hawn and Hamilton (n 28) 5; on carbon markets, see A Goldstein and F Ruef, 
‘View from the Understory, State of Forest Carbon Finance 2016’ (Ecosystem 
Marketplace 2016); K Hamrick and M Gallant, ‘Unlocking Potential: State of the 
Voluntary Carbon Markets 2017’ (Ecosystem Marketplace 2017).
 34Angelsen et al (n 2) 319.
 35In particular, Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol refers to emissions trading as a 
mechanism that could be used by Annex B countries to fulfil their commitments under 
Article 3.
 36K Hamrick and M Gallant, ‘Voluntary Carbon Market Insights: 2018 Outlook and 
First- Quarter Trends’ (Ecosystem Marketplace 2018) 7.
 37Paris Agreement (adopted 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016) 
55 ILM 740 arts 5(2), 6.
 38World Bank Group, ‘State and Trends of Carbon Pricing’ (World Bank 2019); S Lang, M 
Blum and S Leipold, ‘What Future for the Voluntary Carbon Offset Market after Paris? 
An Explorative Study Based on the Discourse Agency Approach’ (2019) 19 Climate Policy 
414; T Cadman et al, ‘From Paris to Poland: A Postmortem of the Climate Change 
Negotiations’ (2018) International Journal of Social Quality 8; Evans et al (n 13).
 39ME Recio, ‘Transnational REDD+ Rule Making: The Regulatory Landscape for REDD+ 
Implementation in Latin America’ (2018) 7 Transnational Environmental Law 277, 279.
 40ibid 278.
 41Wallbott and Recio (n 26).
 42‘Brazil’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution towards Achieving the 
Objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’ <https://
www4.unfccc.int/sites/ ndcst aging/ Publi shedD ocume nts/Brazi l%20Fir st/BRAZI L%20
iND C%20eng lish%20FIN AL.pdf>.
 43ibid.
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The UNFCCC emissions summary states that Brazil’s 2005 an-
nual net greenhouse gas emissions (including land use, land- use 
change and forestry [LULUCF]) were 2.19 gigatonnes (i.e. billion 
tonnes) of carbon dioxide equivalent (Gt CO2e).
44 The Second 
Biennial Update Report of Brazil states that greenhouse gas emis-
sions in 2012 totalled 1.27 Gt CO2e.
45 This is a reduction of 42% 
from the 2005 baseline emissions and surpasses the target of 37% 
for 2025. Under scrutiny, Brazil’s target reveals itself less ambi-
tious than it seems. The current target allows Brazil some flexibil-
ity to grow its energy sector (resulting in an increase in emissions) 
and still meet its 2025 target. Therefore, there is no compelling 
evidence at this time to suggest that Brazil’s nationally determined 
contribution (NDC) could be a driver to increase opportunities for 
REDD+ projects in the Amazon. A more ambitious emissions tar-
get under Brazil’s NDC could lead the government to use carbon 
credits from existing REDD+ projects in the Amazon to offset 
emissions from other growing sectors (transport and energy, 
among others). This would likely increase the domestic demand for 
REDD+ offsets.
4  |  REDD+ PROJEC TS IN THE BR A ZILIAN 
AMA ZON
There are currently 19 active REDD+ projects in the Brazilian 
Amazon registered under Verra (see Appendix 1).46 Only one of 
these— the Suruí Forest Carbon Project (SFCP), which is discussed 
below— is on indigenous lands. Typically, these projects involve pub-
lic and private sector partnerships, including national and interna-
tional organizations.47 The geographic locations of the existing 
REDD+ projects in the Brazilian Amazon are indicated in Figure 1.
5  |  INDIGENOUS REDD+ PROJEC TS IN 
THE BR A ZILIAN AMA ZON
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project is the first and only REDD+ 
 project in the VCM involving indigenous peoples in the Brazilian 
 44United Nations Climate Change Secretariat, ‘Emissions Summary for Brazil’ <https://
unfccc.int/files/ ghg_data/ghg_data_unfcc c/ghg_profi les/appli catio n/pdf/bra_ghg_profi 
le.pdf>.
 45United Nations Climate Change Secretariat, ‘Second Biennial Update Report of 
Brazil’<https://unfccc.int/files/ natio nal_repor ts/non- annex_i_parti es/bienn ial_update_
repor ts/appli catio n/pdf/bur2- ing- 02032 017_final.pdf>.
 46VCS database; two registered forest carbon projects are on Afforestation, 
Reforestation and Revegetation.
 47See Brazilian projects in the VCS- Verra registry: <https://regis try.verra.org/app/searc 
h/VCS>.
F I G U R E  1  The locations of existing 
REDD+ projects in the Brazilian 
Amazon.48
 48VCS- Verra database <https://regis try.verra.org/app/searc h/VCS>; MC Hansen et al 
‘High- Resolution Global Maps of 21st- Century Forest Cover Change’ (2013) 342 Science 
850.
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[Colour figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Amazon.49 It started as a spontaneous demand from the commu-
nity,50 led by the Suruí association Metareilá, and was developed 
by the Institute for Conservation and Sustainable Development of 
Amazonas (IDESAM).51 The aim was to protect 13,575.3 hectares 
from deforestation.52
The carbon credits resulting from the SFCP were recognized as 
being wholly owned by the Suruí through Metareilá.53 The project 
created the Suruí Fund, managed by the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund 
(FUNBIO), as the recipient of the project’s credit sales and other do-
nations. A community consultation process, elaborated by the 
Amazon Conservation Team (ACT— Brazil) and Metareilá, was car-
ried out prior to the establishment of the SFCP, involving several 
meetings with the Suruí communities54 and consultations with gov-
ernmental agencies (FUNAI, the Ministry of Environment, the 
Attorney General’s Office and local governments).55 Consequently, 
a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the commu-
nities and project participants by which the Suruí people expressed 
their consent to develop the project.56
The Project Design Document submitted to Verra attested com-
pliance with Brazilian national law. The right of the Suruí people to 
develop REDD+ projects derived from the Brazilian Constitution, 
which grants indigenous peoples the sole right of use of their lands.57 
Moreover, it was claimed that the aims of the SFCP— to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and avoid deforestation— were in line with 
the 2009 National Policy on Climate Change and the 2004 Plan of 
Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal 
Amazon (PPCDAM).58
The SFCP was registered under Verra in 2009 and received its 
first and only issuance of carbon credits in 2013.59 The credits were 
sold to Natura, a large Brazilian cosmetics company, and to the FIFA 
Wold Cup 2014.60 Since then, the SFCP has seen no verifications or 
new issuances of carbon credits.61
The Suruí project involved 24 communities with a total popula-
tion of approximately 1,231 people.62 Despite their initial support, 
the communities became divided, with some arguing that the REDD+ 
project damaged their way of life.63 The negative media coverage 
appeared in 2014, when Suruí members supported by the Catholic 
Indigenous Missionary Council criticized the use of the revenues 
from credit sales and demanded the end of the project.64 In 2016, 
diamonds were discovered in Suruí territory, leading to an increase 
in illegal logging and mining.65 The rates of deforestation were con-
sequently higher than projected, leading to a decrease in the claim-
able emission reductions and a subsequent decrease in revenue 
from credit sales.66
Although there are significant differences among indigenous 
communities in the Amazon, the Suruí project revealed some of 
the challenges associated with REDD+ projects on indigenous 
lands. One is to generate enough revenue to support the wants 
and needs of the proponent communities and confront external 
threats encroaching into the project area and compromising the 
project outcomes. Despite the interest in the REDD+ concept 
since its inception, the practical implementation of REDD+ has 
proven more challenging than anticipated.67 The Suruí project il-
lustrates how difficult it is to maintain social cohesion when the 
use of REDD+ revenues is perceived as inadequate by members of 
the community. Historical conflicts between different Suruí clans 
increased with the creation of the SFCP because some community 
members believed that project revenues were distributed un-
equally.68 The SFCP also raised concerns that the introduction of 
neoliberal practices among indigenous communities adversely af-
fected their traditional forms of social organization.69 More re-
cently, some indigenous peoples in the Amazon basin have 
criticized the use of REDD+ as a market- based mechanism70 for 
allowing developed countries to continue polluting while 
 49West (n 19); G Alvarez, M Elfving and JCS Andrade, ‘REDD+ Governance and 
Indigenous Peoples in Latin America: The Case of Suruí Carbon Project in the Brazilian 
Amazon Forest’ (2016) 3 Latin American Journal of Management for Sustainable 
Development 133.
 50Alvarez et al (n 49).
 51Other project partners included the Kanindé Association, Forest Trends, the Amazon 
Conservation Team (ACT– Brazil), and the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund; Suruí Forest 




 54ibid 49. The Suruí did not have an agreed protocol establishing how the community 




 58For relevant national legislation, see ibid 25.
 59See project information <https://www.vcspr oject datab ase.org/#/proje ct_detai 
ls/1118>.
 60S Zwick, ‘The Surui Forest Carbon Project: A Case Study’ (USAID 2019).
 61See project information (n 59).
 62Project Description Document (n 51) 20.
 63C Lang, ‘The Suruí Forest Carbon Project Faces Illegal Logging, Gold and Diamond 
Mining. Almir Suruí Is Looking for Alternatives to Carbon’ (Redd- Monitor, 3 October 
2017) <https://redd- monit or.org/2017/10/03/the- surui - fores t- carbo n- proje ct- faces 
- illeg al- loggi ng- gold- and- diamo nd- minin g- almir - surui - is- looki ng- for- alter nativ 
es- to- carbo n/>.
 64J Luna Freire, ‘Epistemological Spaces, Carbon Credits, and Environmental Modernity: 
The Suruí Forest Carbon Project’ (2017) 7 Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural 
Production of the Luso- Hispanic World 225.
 65Zwick (n 60) 9; Lang (n 63).
 66Lang (n 63)
 67R van der Hoff et al, ‘The Parallel Materialization of REDD+ Implementation Discourses 
in Brazil’ (2015) 55 Forest Policy and Economics 37; Forest Trends et al, ‘Investing in 
Forest Carbon: Lessons from the First 20 Years’ (2011); Bottazzi et al (n 19); World Bank 
Institute, ‘Estimating the Opportunity Costs of REDD+: A Training Manual’ (2011); Loaiza 
et al (n 13).
 68LMB de Barcellos and MF Gebara, ‘Climate Mitigation or Knowledge Deprivation? 
Learning from Indigenous Socio- Environmental Funds’ (2020) 6 Revista Produção e 
Desenvolvimento 6.
 69ibid.
 70‘Iquitos Declaration by the Coordinating Body for the Indigenous Peoples’ 
Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COICA)’ (29 April 2011) <http://www.redd- monit 
or.org/wp- conte nt/uploa ds/2011/05/1371.pdf>.
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offsetting the damage they cause through payments to indigenous 
communities based on their forest conservation efforts.71
Nonetheless, there are also positive aspects of the Suruí project.72 
The project indicated that public– private partnerships can be estab-
lished towards common climate mitigation goals.73 While not all cred-
its have been sold, private companies have purchased carbon offsets 
from the SFCP in support of the project.74 Various REDD+ projects 
have been registered in Brazil under Verra. Together, they have the 
potential to avoid millions of tonnes of CO2 and to be commercialized 
in the VCM. REDD+ projects in Brazil have also contributed to building 
technical capacity of local project developers and other stakeholders.
More than 10 years after the SFCP was created, and in light of 
recent developments under the UNFCCC and some new legislation 
introduced in Brazil, the following sections enquire into whether 
REDD+ projects in the VCM are currently a viable option for indige-
nous communities in the Amazon. In particular, we look at the legal, 
technical and market requirements involved in implementing REDD+ 
projects in the VCM.
6  |  LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REDD+ 
PROJEC TS
The discussion concerning the legal requirements for REDD+ pro-
jects proposed in this section begins with an analysis of whether 
Brazil’s national law currently allows REDD+ projects to be devel-
oped in the VCM. We conclude that there are no legal impediments 
for implementing REDD+ projects in the voluntary market. We then 
discuss the specific legal requirements for REDD+ under Brazilian 
legislation if new projects are established under the VCM involving 
indigenous communities in the Amazon.
6.1  |  REDD+ under national law
There is currently no specific law or policy in Brazil regulating REDD+ 
projects in the VCM. In the absence of specific legislation regulating 
REDD+ as a market- based mechanism, this section examines na-
tional laws and policies that are relevant to such REDD+ activities— 
for example, regarding climate change, fund- based REDD+, forests 
and indigenous peoples’ rights.
The 1988, Brazilian Constitution defines the Amazon forest as 
part of the national heritage.75 All levels of government (Union, 
states, municipalities and Federal District) have shared responsibility 
to protect the environment.76 The Constitution makes no references 
to market mechanisms as a tool for forest protection. Likewise, the 
2012 Forest Code makes no specific mention of REDD+,77 but it 
does envisage the development of markets for ecosystem services 
to drive conservation and reforestation.78
Brazil’s 2009 National Climate Change Policy sets the guidelines 
for tackling climate mitigation and adaptation.79 Several national 
agencies are responsible for its implementation,80 including a 
National Climate Change Fund established in 2009. The Amazon 
Fund, created in 2008 through initial donations from Norway and 
Germany and managed by the Brazilian National Development Bank, 
has also been a key source of REDD+ funding in Brazil.81 The goals 
established by the National Climate Change Policy of relevance to 
REDD+ include enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks, pre-
serving natural resources and promoting the reforestation and res-
toration of degraded areas.82 The policy also refers to a Brazilian 
Emission Reduction Market83 for the trading of certified avoided 
emissions, but this market has not yet been created. Traditionally, 
Brazil has advocated for REDD+ as a ‘centralized’ mechanism, 
whereby REDD+ projects receive direct financing under the 
UNFCCC from international donors and are managed by the federal 
government,84 rather than being funded through an international 
carbon market mechanism and individual REDD+ projects in the 
VCM.
In 2016, Brazil launched its National REDD+ Strategy 
(ENREDD+),85 which aims to eliminate deforestation, promote the 
conservation and restoration of forests, and enable a sustainable 
forestry economy. Specific objectives include monitoring and evalu-
ating the impact of REDD+ policies, ensuring consistency between 
(federal, state and municipal) policies, and mobilizing capacity and 
resources for forest conservation and sustainable use. There is no 
explicit reference to REDD+ as a market- based mechanism in the 
VCM and REDD+ is defined under ENREDD+ as a funded- based 
mechanism.86 Prior to ENREDD+, the 2004 Plan of Action for the 
Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon was 
also an important instrument to prevent deforestation in the 
 71Wallbott and Recio (n 26) 795.
 72As suggested, carbon markets and the commodification discourse in forest 
conservation cannot be regarded as a failure just yet; see van der Hoff et al (n 67). See 
also Loaiza et al (n 13).
 73Alvarez et al (n 49); F Toni, IAR Ferreira and INR Ferreira, ‘Adapting to Emerging 
Institutions: REDD+ Projects in the Territories of the Suruí and Cinta- Larga Indigenous 
Peoples’ (ICARUS II Conference – Climate Vulnerability and Adaptation: Marginal 
Peoples and Environments, Ann Arbor, Michigan, May 2011).
 74van der Hoff et al (n 67).
 75Brazilian Federal Constitution 1988 (Brazilian Constitution) art 225(4).
 76ibid art 23(6); J Costenbader (ed), Legal Frameworks for REDD: Design and 
Implementation at the National Level (IUCN 2009) 200.
 77Brazilian Forest Code, Law 12.651 of 25 May 2012.
 78ibid art 41(I).
 79National Climate Change Policy, Law 12.187 of 29 December 2009 regulated by 
Decree 7.390 of 9 December 2010.
 80ibid art 6(I).
 81Established by Decree 6.527 of 1 August 2008; see AE Duchelle et al, ‘Linking Forest 
Tenure Reform, Environmental Compliance, and Incentives: Lessons from REDD+ 
Initiatives in the Brazilian Amazon’ (2014) 55 World Development 53, 56.
 82Law 12.187 of 29 December 2009 art 4.
 83ibid art 9.
 84van der Hoff et al (n 67) 41; Piffer Salles et al (n 9) 99.
 85Brasília, ‘ENREDD+: Estratégia Nacional para REDD+’ (2016) <http://redd.mma.gov.br/
image s/publi cacoe s/enredd_docum ento_web.pdf>.
 86ibid 9.
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Amazon. It has been implemented in four phases (the fourth one up 
to 2020). The PPCDAM encourages sustainable productive activi-
ties and the use of ecosystem services.87
The above overview indicates that there is currently no specific 
legislation in Brazil incentivizing REDD+ projects in the VCM. Nor is 
there any explicit prohibition of such projects. Hence, we argue that 
there are no legal impediments for REDD+ projects in the VCM for 
two main reasons. First, the current legislation does not explicitly pro-
hibit the implementation of REDD+ projects in the VCM. Second, such 
REDD+ projects are in line with the goals of the relevant Brazilian laws 
and policies discussed above, notably those of reducing deforestation, 
enhancing carbon sinks and restoring degraded areas.88 In view of 
this, the following sections examine the specific legal requirements for 
developing REDD+ projects in the VCM, particularly on indigenous 
lands, if new projects are established in the Brazilian Amazon under 
Verra or other international carbon standards.
6.2  |  REDD+ projects on indigenous lands
Indigenous lands in Brazil are not categorized as protected areas 
under the National System of Protected Areas.89 However, indige-
nous territories have the highest level of protection by law because 
they are regulated by the Constitution.90 The federal government 
owns the lands ‘traditionally occupied’ by indigenous peoples. These 
lands are defined as follows:
those on which they live on a permanent basis, those 
used for their productive activities, those indispens-
able to the preservation of the environmental re-
sources necessary for their well- being and for their 
physical and cultural expression, according to their 
uses, customs and traditions.91
The 2007 National Policy on the Sustainable Development of 
Traditional Peoples and Communities92 defines ‘traditional peoples 
and communities’ as culturally differentiated groups that recognize 
themselves as such, with their own forms of social organization and 
cultural, social, religious and economic needs, using practices 
transmitted by tradition.93 The policy also recognizes indigenous 
peoples’ right to territorial integrity and over natural resources.94
Indigenous peoples do not own their lands, but they exercise 
permanent tenure over the lands that they traditionally occupy.95 
Their right to permanent tenure involves the effective occupation of 
the land, according to their uses, customs and traditions.96 Indigenous 
lands cannot be leased and no acts that restrict the full exercise of 
indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure should be permitted.97 This 
right is also recognized under the 1973 Indigenous Peoples’ Statute.98
Indigenous communities have ‘original rights’ to their traditional 
lands99 and no other rights can prevail over such rights. For example, 
establishing protected areas in indigenous territories would be un-
constitutional, as it would restrict indigenous peoples’ original land 
rights.100 In Brazil, the Armed Forces and the Federal Police ensure 
the protection of indigenous lands.101 FUNAI represents indigenous 
communities and assists them in judicial (and extrajudicial) dis-
putes.102 The 2012 National Policy of Territorial and Environmental 
Management of Indigenous Lands provides further guidelines re-
garding the management of Indigenous territories and the role of 
FUNAI.103
REDD+ projects developed on indigenous lands that violate the 
rights discussed above— notably, the rights to territorial integrity, 
permanent land tenure and original rights— would be illegal and/or 
unconstitutional. For example, REDD+ activities that limit access of 
indigenous communities to their territory violate Article 18 of the 
Indigenous Peoples’ Statute, which asserts that no acts restricting 
the full exercise of indigenous peoples’ permanent tenure over the 
land should be permitted.104 Moreover, according to the Constitution, 
‘acts with a view to occupation, domain and possession of indige-
nous lands are null and void, producing no legal effects’.105
6.2.1  |  Legal requirements for REDD+ on 
indigenous lands
Indigenous lands are ‘inalienable and indispensable, and the rights 
thereto are not subject to limitation’.106 The Constitution allows pro-
ductive activities in indigenous territories, in so far as they are nec-
essary for the wellbeing and the physical and cultural expression of 
indigenous communities.107 Therefore, indigenous peoples are enti-
 87Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon, 
Operational Plan 2016– 2020 <http://redd.mma.gov.br/en/legal - and- publi c- polic y- frame 
work/ppcdam>.
 88These projects include the Jari Pará REDD+ Project <https://www.vcspr oject datab ase.
org/#/proje ct_detai ls/1811>, the Fazenda Sao Paulo Agroforestry Project <https://www.
vcspr oject datab ase.org/#/proje ct_detai ls/1663> and the Manoa REDD+ Project 
<https://www.vcspr oject datab ase.org/#/proje ct_detai ls/1571>.
 89Law 9.985 of 18 July 2000.
 90Brazilian Constitution (n 75) Chapter 8.
 90Brazilian Constitution (n 75) Chapter 8.
 92Decree 6.040 of 7 February 2007.
 93ibid art 3.
 94ibid art 2.
 95Brazilian Constitution (n 75) art 231(2).
 96Law 6.001 of 19 December 1973 art 23.
 97ibid art 18.
 98ibid art 22.
 99Brazilian Constitution (n 75) art 231(1).
 100ibid art 231.
 101Law 6.001 of 19 December 1973 art 34.
 102ibid art 35.
 103Decree 7.747 of 5 June 2012.
 104Law 6.001 of 19 December 1973 art 18.
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tled to develop productive activities, because their land rights are 
not subject to limitation, if such activities are according to their uses, 
customs and traditions.108 There are examples of indigenous com-
munities in the Amazon carrying out economic activities, such as 
ecotourism, sports fishing and commercializing native products.109
Indigenous peoples have exclusive use rights to the riches of the 
soil, rivers and lakes within their lands.110 Even though indigenous 
lands are owned by the State, indigenous peoples have the right to 
explore the utilities, uses and fruits of natural resources or property, 
as well as the legal right to use and derive profit from those natural 
resources.111 This right applies exclusively to indigenous communi-
ties, as anyone else is prohibited from hunting, fishing, gathering 
fruits, and undertaking agricultural, cattle ranching or extractive ac-
tivities.112 Two exceptions to the exclusive use right concern miner-
als and hydric resources.113 According to the Brazilian Constitution, 
the Parliament can authorize the use of hydric resources and mining 
on indigenous lands but only after hearing the communities involved, 
which must also participate in the results of such activities.114 With 
regard to mining, their participation shall be ensured ‘as set forth by 
law’.115 Any such law, however, has never been adopted. Therefore, 
mining in indigenous territories is still considered illegal. The 1989 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention under the International 
Labour Organization (ILO Convention No. 169) recognizes that, 
where the State retains ownership of mineral and other subsurface 
resources, governments must ensure consultation procedures, 
benefit- sharing and compensation for indigenous communities.116 
Likewise, the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)117 requires States to obtain free, prior 
and informed consent (FPIC) for the approval of any projects affect-
ing indigenous territories.118 Brazil has ratified ILO Convention No. 
169, which was incorporated under domestic law through Decree 
10.088/2019, and endorsed UNDRIP.119 Therefore, FPIC is a re-
quirement under Brazilian law for projects involving indigenous peo-
ples, as discussed below.120 In this respect, the 2010 Declaration 
from the Latin American Indigenous Forum on Climate Change 
states that REDD+ projects must ensure full compliance with 
UNDRIP and other legal instruments.121
As noted, the Brazilian Constitution allows productive activities 
in indigenous territories compatible with traditional values and cus-
toms. Therefore, as a form of economic activity, REDD+ projects in 
the VCM are in principle permitted as they involve forest protection 
and/or ecological restoration.122 However, REDD+ projects imple-
mented on indigenous lands must observe additional legal require-
ments under Brazilian law. Notably, REDD+ projects involving 
indigenous peoples require a written authorization from FUNAI123 
to contact indigenous peoples and access their land. FUNAI’s autho-
rization, albeit necessary, is not sufficient to implement REDD+ proj-
ects in indigenous territories.
REDD+ projects also require the FPIC of indigenous peoples— a 
well- established principle in international law, as noted above.124 
Under Brazilian law, this requirement is foreseen by Law 13.123/2015 
on Genetic Heritage, Protection and Access to Traditional 
Knowledge. FPIC is defined as ‘formal consent, previously granted 
by indigenous peoples or traditional communities according to their 
uses, customs and traditions or community protocols’.125 It is re-
quired for economic activities involving genetic resources and indig-
enous peoples’ traditional knowledge.126 This can be achieved 
through the signing of a written agreement, an audio- visual record, 
the opinion of an official body or community protocols.127 The 
Brazilian legislation does not devise specific procedures that com-
munities should follow to make use of such protocols. Some indige-
nous peoples in Brazil have adopted their own community protocols 
to define how they should be contacted and consulted.128 These 
protocols are monitored and implemented with the support of 
FUNAI and the Attorney General’s Office.129 Other national laws 
and policies, such as the 2012 National Policy on Environmental and 
Territorial Management of Indigenous Lands, also recognize the right 
of indigenous peoples to FPIC.130
Moreover, REDD+ projects must ensure equitable benefit- 
sharing, both financial (payments for carbon credits) and non- 
financial (such as recreational and educational activities). Law 
13.123/2015 establishes how this is to be attained in economic 
 108ibid.
 109A Villas- Bôas, ‘Diagnóstico da qualidade de vida e da integridade dos terriórios do 
povo Kayapó’ (Instituto Socio Ambiental 2014); Associação Floresta Protegida, ‘Plano de 
Gestão Territorial e Ambiental da Terra Indígena Las Casas’ (2017).
 110Brazilian Constitution (n 75) art 231(2); Law 6.001 of 19 December 1973 art 24.
 111Piffer Salles et al (n 9) 99.
 112Law 6.001 of 19 December 1973 art 17(1).
 113Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988 art 231(3).
 114ibid.
 115ibid.
 116Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169) (adopted 27 June 1989, 
entered into force 5 September 1991) 28 ILM 1382 (ILO Convention No. 169) art 15; 
Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 
December 1993) 1760 UNTS 79 (CBD).
 117UNGA ‘Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (2 
October 2007) (UNDRIP) art 32(2). See also UNGA ‘Programme of Action for the Second 
International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People’ UN Doc A/60/270 (18 August 
2005) para 58.
 118UNDRIP (n 117) art 32(2).
 119Decree 10.088 of 5 November 2019.
 120Law 13.123 of 20 May 2015 art 9.
 121Wallbott and Recio (n 26) 795.
 122Brazilian Constitution (n 75) art 231(1).
 123See on access to indigenous lands <http://www.funai.gov.br/index.php/servi cos/
ingre sso- em- terra - indigena> and the requirements for scientific research in particular 
under Normative Instruction 01/PRESI of 29 November 1995.
 124See, for example, ILO Convention No. 169 (n 116) art 6; UNDRIP (n 117) art 19.
 125Law 13.123 of 20 May 2015 art 2(6).
 126ibid art 11.
 127ibid art 9.
 128Brazilian Attorney General’s Office, ‘Protocolo de consulta prévia dos povos 
indígenas’ <http://www.mpf.mp.br/atuac ao- temat ica/ccr6/docum entos - e- publi cacoe s/
proto colos - de- consu lta- dos- povos - indig enas>.
 129Law 13.123 of 20 May 2015 art 6.
 130This policy was established under Decree 7.747 of 5 July 2012. Reference to free, 
prior and informed consent (FPIC) and the the ILO Convention No. 169 is made in art 
3(11).
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activities involving the use of genetic heritage and access to tradi-
tional knowledge.131 This law is relevant to REDD+ projects based 
on an expansive approach to benefit- sharing, which encompasses 
not only the use of genetic resources but also the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity more broadly.132 Law 13.123/2015 
requires benefit- sharing agreements, including a description of the 
products subject to economic exploitation, duration of the activity, 
methods of benefit- sharing, rights and responsibilities, intellectual 
property rights, termination, penalties and dispute settlement meth-
ods.133 The right to benefit- sharing is also recognized in various in-
ternational treaties to which Brazil is a party.134
REDD+ projects in the VCM involve the signing of contracts or 
other arrangements among local communities and project partners. 
If REDD+ projects limit indigenous peoples’ rights, such as land 
rights, or fail to meet the legal requirements discussed above (such 
as FPIC and benefit- sharing), such contracts or arrangements can 
be considered illegal and/or unconstitutional. These requirements 
under national and international law offer an important safeguard 
to indigenous peoples, making their consent a prerequisite for the 
establishment of REDD+ projects and recognizing their rights as the 
main beneficiaries of REDD+ revenues.
6.2.2  |  Ownership of REDD+ carbon credits
The ownership of carbon credits resulting from REDD+ projects de-
veloped in the VCM can be difficult to establish as they often involve 
several stakeholders, including communities, local governments, 
nongovernmental organizations and private actors. As noted above, 
indigenous peoples have the exclusive use right to the riches of the 
soil, rivers and lakes within their lands.135 The Indigenous Peoples’ 
Statute recognizes that this right includes the right to the possession 
and use of natural resources and all utilities on indigenous lands.136 
The Brazilian Civil Code also recognizes that ‘the fruits and other 
products of a thing, even when separated, belong to its owner’.137 
REDD+ projects generate tradable carbon credits, which logically 
are the ‘fruits’ accrued from the forest through REDD+ activities. 
Arguably, carbon credits deriving from REDD+ projects in the VCM 
are owned by indigenous peoples, who have exclusive use rights to 
the riches of the soil, including forests, and own the ‘fruits’ of a 
thing— which, for REDD+ projects, are carbon credits. Consequently, 
indigenous communities are entitled to decide how carbon revenues 
are to be shared among project partners. As noted above, carbon 
credits from the SFCP were recognized as being wholly owned by 
the Suruí people through Metareilá.138 It is suggested that, even if 
carbon ownership is not nationally regulated, there is a legal assump-
tion that emission reductions would be treated like any other eco-
nomic benefit of a particular activity.139 The entity that has a right to 
the forest land is usually recognized as the owner of carbon rights.140
Having discussed the main legal requirements for developing 
REDD+ projects in the Brazilian Amazon, we next examine whether 
such projects are currently a viable option for indigenous communi-
ties by considering two other key aspects of REDD+ projects in the 
VCM: the technical and market requirements.
7  |  TECHNIC AL REQUIREMENTS FOR 
REDD+ IN THE VOLUNTARY MARKET
The first step in any forest carbon project is to identify a suitable 
standard and methodology.141 Currently, the most used and compre-
hensive carbon standard is Verra.142 Other standards with REDD+ 
methodologies include, for example, Plan Vivo, the Gold Standard 
and the American Carbon Registry. Carbon market standards pub-
lish methodologies and guidelines for project proponents to follow 
in order to deliver REDD+ projects and earn carbon credits. Verra 
has several methodologies that address different baseline scenarios 
in various sectors (such as energy, transport, waste, agriculture and 
forestry), including REDD+ methodologies.143 Despite the diversity 
of methodologies, forest carbon projects, such as REDD+, involve 
five basic steps from the initial project design to completion: (i) fea-
sibility study for estimating the carbon stocks and potential carbon 
credits; (ii) field survey to confirm the projected carbon stocks; (iii) 
preparation and submission of project documents to the selected 
standard (such as the project design document and monitoring plan); 
(iv) verification and validation144 of the project by independent audi-
tors and (v) monitoring report and risk assessment submitted 
throughout the project life cycle.145 Each of those steps involves sig-
nificant technical capacity and resources.146
 131Law 13.123 of 20 May 2015 art 25.
 132See E Morgera and E Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of Benefit Sharing: Linking 
Biodiversity and Community Livelihoods’ (2010) 19 Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law 150.
 133Law 13.123 of 20 May 2015 art 26.
 134Including the CBD (n 116) and its Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources 
and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (adopted 29 
October 2010, entered into force 12 October 2014) <https://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/
proto col/nagoy a- proto col- en.pdf>. See also Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and 
UN- REDD Programme, ‘Guidelines on Stakeholder Engagement’ (2012); UNGA 
‘Programme of Action for the Second International Decade of the World’s Indigenous 
People’ UN Doc A/RES/60/142 (7 February 2006).
 135Brazilian Federal Constitution 1988 art 231; Law 6.001 of 19 December 1973 art 24.
 136Law 6.001 of 19 December 1973 art 24.
 137Brazilian Civil Code, Law 10.406 of 10 January 2002 art 1,232; Piffer Salles et al (n 9) 
99.
 138Project Description Document (n 51) 12, 29.
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and Guide’ (Forest Trends 2011).
 145Forest Trends et al (n 67).
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REDD+ projects in the VCM can be proposed by an individual, 
organization and/or community (project proponent) and are imple-
mented by project developers. To receive carbon credits, the project 
proponent must demonstrate that REDD+ activities achieved the ex-
pected results, such as carbon sequestration and/or avoided carbon 
emissions. When the outcomes of a REDD+ project are verified by 
third- party auditors, through a process known as verification, the car-
bon standard issues carbon credits, which are then commercialized.
Projects involving local or indigenous peoples also require 
proof of FPIC and community participation.147 This usually in-
volves extensive and costly consultation processes with local 
communities and governmental agencies. Other technical require-
ments of REDD+ projects relate to additionality and leakage. 
Additionality is the determination of whether the project will lead 
to the expected outcomes when compared to the baseline emis-
sions.148 Project proponents must demonstrate that the project 
outcomes would not have been achieved in the absence of the 
project.149 Leakage in REDD+ describes the displacement of emis-
sions from deforestation or forest degradation from one forest 
area to another as a result of the project.150 Each of these techni-
cal requirements must be extensively demonstrated in project 
documents and are subject to verification from external auditors. 
The technical expertise and resources involved in implementing 
REDD+ projects are not available within local communities. In 
practice, REDD+ projects in the Amazon could only be developed 
with financial support from donors and private sector partners,151 
particularly to meet the stringent technical requirements involved 
in implementing REDD+ projects.
8  |  REDD+ MARKET REQUIREMENTS
Verra is currently the only standard to have REDD+ carbon projects 
generating carbon credits in Brazil, with 21 verified forest carbon 
projects in total.152 The first Brazilian REDD credits (known as 
Verified Carbon Units, or VCUs) were issued in 2012 to a project 
avoiding planned deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon.153 The car-
bon credit information for REDD+ projects globally is publicly avail-
able on Verra’s database. We used this database to calculate the 
total number of credits generated by Brazilian projects between 
2009 and 2020. Verra issued 18.98 million carbon credits to Brazilian 
forest projects in this period, 57% of the 33.6 million audited and 
claimable emission reductions generated by these projects (see 
Figure 2). As of August 2020, just 12.21 million credits had been 
‘retired’, meaning sold. Once carbon credits are purchased, they are 
transferred to the buyer of the credits and then retired on behalf of 
the offset buyer. This means that the offset is removed from the 
market to ensure that it cannot be sold again.154
Figure 2 demonstrates the low credit sales of REDD+ projects 
in the Brazilian Amazon (green line). The claimable emission reduc-
tions (blue line) are those that can be verified by an independent 
auditor and— if emission reductions are verified— converted into 
carbon credits. In other words, ‘claimable emission reductions’ re-
late to the potential carbon credits that a project can generate. The 
potential carbon credits that could have been generated by REDD+ 
projects in the Brazilian Amazon (blue line) are much higher than 
those that were actually verified and issued (red line). The carbon 
credits that were finally sold are even lower (green line). The rates 
 147P Anderson, ‘Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in REDD+: Principles and Approaches 
for Policy and Project Development’ (Center for People and Forests 2011). See also VCS 
Standard 3.16.11– 3.16.19 <https://verra.org/wp- conte nt/uploa ds/2020/03/VCS- Stand 
ard- v4.0_Updat ed.pdf>.
 148The Nature Conservancy, ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
(REDD): A Casebook of On- the Ground Experience’ (2010).
 149The VCS has a tool for assessing the additionality of a proposed project, which 
involves a four- step process.
 150Olander and Ebeling (n 144).
 151Examples of REDD+ projects funded by the private sector include the CIKEL Brazilian 
Amazon REDD APD project <https://www.vcspr oject datab ase.org/#/proje ct_detai 
ls/832>, the Ecomapua Amazon REDD project <https://www.vcspr oject datab ase.org/#/
proje ct_detai ls/1094> and the Envira Amazonia Project <https://www.vcspr oject datab 
ase.org/#/proje ct_detai ls/1382>.
 152VCS Project Database <https://www.vcspr oject datab ase.org/#/home>.
 153The CIKEL Brazilian Amazon REDD Project in the state of Para. See the VCS Project 
Database <http://www.vcspr oject datab ase.org/#/proje ct_detai ls/832>.
 154C Riedy and A Atherton, ‘Carbon Offset Watch: 2008 Assessment Report’ (Institute 
for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney 2008) 5, 25.
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of credit issuances and sales have been increasing since 2016, but 
the total volume of credit issuances remains low compared to the 
total verified claimable emissions. Figure 2 shows that the supply 
of voluntary carbon credits vastly outweighs the demand.
Project proponents face large upfront costs to develop proj-
ects and issue carbon credits. One of these costs is a fee applied 
to each credit when issued. To minimize the costs, proponents 
can choose not to issue verified credits that they cannot sell. This 
avoids the issuance fee until a sale is guaranteed. This strategy has 
an impact on a project’s verification process. Our analysis shows 
that 11 of the 21 projects still held unissued credits from a previ-
ous verification when the next verification was due. It is likely that 
proponents cannot justify the high auditing costs for projects due 
to the lack of sales and the low values they currently experience 
on the voluntary market.
Forest carbon projects traditionally had a small share in interna-
tional carbon markets.155 The reasons for this relate to their high mar-
ket price and the uncertainties related to REDD+ projects.156 The 
cheapest carbon credits often come from renewable energy proj-
ects.157 There has been a recent increase in the volume of offsets from 
REDD+ projects in Latin America, with almost all projects located in 
Peru.158 The high costs of implementing REDD+ projects in the VCM 
and the related higher market price compared to other offsets— for 
example, from energy projects— are well known.159 Some of the costs 
to be factored into REDD+ projects include community engagement 
activities, technical services, consultancy fees, legal services, auditing, 
carbon registry and broker fees. There are also high risks associated 
with REDD+, which is a factor limiting private sector investment.160 
Common risks include illegal activities (such as logging, mining and ag-
riculture) threatening forest project areas, leakage, permanence, and 
the impacts of natural events (such as forest fires and plagues).
Globally, the VCM has suffered from an oversupply of carbon 
credits161 and forest carbon projects have met with relatively low 
demand.162 Prices for REDD+ offsets fell 47 percent between 2016 
and 2018 (from US$ 4.40 to US$ 2.35 per tonne).163 In 2019, renew-
able energy projects dominated transactions in the VCM by volume, 
although REDD+ was the most popular project type across all cate-
gories.164 The VCM is also driven by speculation about future com-
pliance carbon markets. As the future of a global carbon market 
remains uncertain, many investors have engaged in the VCM only at 
very small scales.165 The longer the uncertainty remains, the more 
likely it becomes that most investors will wait to see how the market 
develops.166
There may be an increase in demand for offsets in the VCM 
driven by the operationalization of the Carbon Offsetting and 
Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) adopted in 
2016 by the members of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization.167 Airlines will be expected to purchase carbon offsets 
to compensate a percentage of the growth in CO2 emissions above 
the 2020 level. With the proposed implementation of CORSIA, 
starting with a pilot phase (2021– 2023),168 the resultant increase in 
demand for offsets may address the current oversupply seen in the 
VCM. The timelines for the purchasing of offsets, and how this 
scheme will relate to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, are currently 
unknown. It is also uncertain whether the Brazilian government will 
support REDD+ projects as a market mechanism and create a na-
tional carbon market in the future. The low demand and price for 
forest carbon credits in the VCM, which are associated with the 
stringent and costly technical requirements for implementing 
REDD+ under international standards such as Verra, indicate that 
REDD+ projects in the VCM may not currently be an attractive mar-
ket option for protecting forests in the Brazilian Amazon.
9  |  CONCLUSION
REDD+ as a market mechanism in the voluntary market, although 
not prohibited under Brazilian law, currently faces significant barri-
ers due to uncertainties in the international climate change regime 
regarding a future carbon market, and due to technical and market 
constraints associated with the implementation of REDD+ projects 
in the VCM.
To be an effective tool for forest protection, REDD+ projects 
in the VCM must provide an ongoing source of income for project 
proponents, who can be either private landowners or communities 
such as indigenous peoples. REDD+ VCM projects can effectively 
provide a reliable source of income if carbon credits are sold reg-
ularly and the revenues arising out of REDD+ credit sales are re-
verted back to project proponents who, based on such payments, 
have the capacity and the commitment to ensure that their forests 
are maintained. If REDD+ in the VCM ensures a regular source of 
income, it can become a driver for forest protection. When project 
 155W van der Gaast, R Sikkema and M Vohrer, ‘The Contribution of Forest Carbon Credit 
Projects to Addressing the Climate Change Challenge’ (2018) 18 Climate Policy 42.
 156ibid.
 157S Donofrio et al, ‘Financing Emissions Reductions for the Future: State of the 
Voluntary Carbon Markets 2019’ (Ecosystem Marketplace 2019) 6.
 158Peru accounted for 86% of the overall 22.8 MtCO2e increase in volume from Latin 
America; ibid 5.
 159Forest Trends et al (n 67); Olander and Ebeling (n 144); MC Cenamo et al, ‘Guia sobre 
Projetos de REDD+ na américa Latina’ (2010).
 160A Goldstein, ‘Converging at the Crossroads: State of Forest Carbon Finance 2015’ 
(Ecosystem Marketplace 2015).
 161Donofrio et al (n 157).
 162van der Gaast et al (n 155).
 163Donofrio et al (n 157) 8.
 164S Donofrio et al, ‘Voluntary Carbon Market and the Post Pandemic Recovery’ 
(Ecosystem Marketplace 2020) 6.
 165Forest Trends et al (n 67).
 166ibid.
 167International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), ‘Consolidated statement of 
continuing ICAO policies and practices related to environmental protection – Global 
Market- based Measure (MBM) scheme’ (September 2016) <https://www.icao.int/envir 
onmen tal- prote ction/ docum ents/resol ution_a39_3.pdf>.
 168ICAO Resolution A40- 19: ‘Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies and 
practices related to environmental protection – Carbon Offsetting and Reduction 
Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA)’ art 9(a).
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proponents can rely on continuous REDD+ VCM credit sales, they 
are less likely to engage in or allow unsustainable activities, such 
as logging or forest conversion. REDD+ projects in the VCM then 
act as an incentive for forest conservation over destructive prac-
tices. However, if REDD+ VCM projects are unable to provide a 
sustainable source of income for project proponents, due to low or 
irregular credit sales, they are unlikely to prevent activities such as 
mining, commercial logging and industrial- scale cropping, whether 
legal or illegal. Our analysis of REDD+ VCM projects in the Brazilian 
Amazon revealed that there has been limited demand, resulting in 
low credit sales. Consequently, revenues have not provided an ef-
fective source of income for project proponents. The current mar-
ket scenario for forest carbon credits in the Brazilian Amazon may, 
however, change driven, for example, by the introduction of future 
compliance markets, either in Brazil or internationally, or due to the 
uptake of sectoral offset schemes such as CORSIA. If this occurs, 
REDD+ projects in the VCM may become an attractive market- 
based option and tool for forest conservation.
Currently, there is no certainty as to whether the UNFCCC 
will endorse a market- based approach to REDD+ under the Paris 
Agreement and introduce a global carbon market. If clear rules for an 
international and compulsory carbon market are established under 
the UNFCCC, or if a Brazilian emission reduction market is created, 
as foreseen under the National Climate Change Policy, REDD+ proj-
ects as a market mechanism may become a viable and attractive 
option for protecting forests in the Amazon. Further developments 
with CORSIA may also have a positive impact on future carbon mar-
kets in terms of generating demand for carbon credits, including 
from REDD+ projects in the Brazilian Amazon. If new REDD+ proj-
ects are established on indigenous lands in the Brazilian Amazon, 
the main legal requirements under the national laws and policies dis-
cussed here must be observed.
REDD+ projects involve technical requirements, such as demon-
strating compliance with FPIC, equitable benefit- sharing, addition-
ality, permanence and avoidance of leakage. Each of the steps in 
REDD+ implementation imposed by international carbon standards 
such as Verra demand significant technical capacity and financial 
resources. The high costs and time involved in meeting such tech-
nical requirements are factored in by private investors and may be a 
deterrent to implementing new REDD+ projects in the VCM in the 
absence of market demand for carbon credits.
Forest carbon projects also rely on a dynamic carbon market to 
be successful. Ultimately, new REDD+ projects in the Amazon can 
only be justified if there is market demand for REDD+ credits in the 
VCM. Our analysis of the existing REDD+ projects in the Brazilian 
Amazon revealed that all credit issuances have been for verified 
emission reductions from 2018 or earlier. Globally, the voluntary 
market has suffered from an oversupply of carbon credits and low 
market prices. The data suggest that there is not enough demand 
for REDD+ credits in the VCM, and therefore little incentive to im-
plement new REDD+ projects in the Amazon in the current market 
and international policy context. In parallel to the debate on carbon 
markets, fund- based REDD+ activities will continue to exist and pro-
vide funding and support for local and indigenous communities.
ORCID
Beatriz Garcia  https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6364-292X 
Leticia Canal Vieira  https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5810-8565 
Brendan Mackey  https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1996-4064 
Beatriz Garcia is an Assistant Professor at the School of Law, 
Western Sydney University. She has worked for Forests Alive, a 
carbon markets company based in Sydney, managing projects in 
the voluntary carbon market. The company was among the first 
in the world to commercialize forest carbon credits and its proj-
ects currently protect approximately 38,000 hectares of native 
forests in Australia. She has also worked for the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva. 
She holds a PhD in international law from the Graduate Institute, 
Geneva, Switzerland.
Lawrence Rimmer is a technical specialist at Forests Alive, a 
private company that delivered forest carbon projects initially 
in the voluntary carbon market and currently under Australia’s 
Emissions Reduction Fund.
Leticia Canal Vieira is a research fellow at the University of 
Bologna in a project focused on the decarbonization process of 
industrial ecosystems. She holds a PhD in environmental plan-
ning from Griffith University in Australia.
Brendan Mackey is a Director of the Climate Action Beacon at 
Griffith University. He has a PhD in ecology from the Australian 
National University. He is currently a Coordinating Lead Author 
for the IPCC 6th Assessment Report.
This article was supported by a research grant from a charitable 
organization which neither seeks nor permits publicity for its ef-
forts. The donor had no influence on any aspect of the research 
reported here. Thanks to Sonia Hugh for creating the map in 
Figure 1. We are also grateful to Ricardo Pereira, Editor of the 
special edition, for his insightful feedback, and the anonymous 
reviewers for their valuable comments that served to improved
the final manuscript.
How to cite this article: Garcia B, Rimmer L, Canal Vieira L, 
Mackey B. REDD+ and forest protection on 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































GARCIA et Al. | 219
